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ABSTRACT 
This article presents a tutorial/discussion of three commonly-used IEEE 802.11 wireless network security standards: 
WEP, WPA and WPA2. A detailed analysis of the RC4 algorithm supporting WEP is presented, including its vulnera-
bilities. The WPA and WPA2 encryption protocols’ most relevant aspects and technical characteristics are reviewed 
for a comparative analysis of the three standards in terms of the security they provide. Special attention has been 
paid to WEP encryption by using an educational simulation tool written in C++ Builder for facilitating the unders-
tanding of this protocol at academic level. Two practical cases of wireless security configurations using Cisco net-
working equipment are also presented: configuring and enabling WPA-Personal and WPA2-Personal (these being 
security options used by TKIP and AES, respectively). 
Keywords: 802.11i, 802.1x, CCMP, TKIP, WEP, WLAN, WPA, WPA2.  
 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo presenta una discusión tutorial de tres estándares de seguridad de uso común en las redes inalámbri-
cas IEEE 802.11: WEP, WPA y WPA2. Se realiza un análisis detallado del algoritmo RC4 que soporta a WEP y se in-
dican sus vulnerabilidades. También se revisan los aspectos y características técnicas más relevantes de los protoco-
los de cifrado WPA y WPA2 con la finalidad de hacer un análisis comparativo de los tres estándares en términos de 
la seguridad que ellos proporcionan. Se ha dado especial atención al aspecto didáctico del funcionamiento del ci-
frado WEP mediante el desarrollo y uso de una herramienta de simulación escrita en C++ Builder para facilitar su 
comprensión a nivel académico. Igualmente, se presentan dos casos prácticos de seguridad de red inalámbrica con 
equipos del fabricante Cisco, habilitando y configurando WPA Personal y WPA2 Personal, opciones de seguridad 
que usan TKIP y AES, respectivamentements. 
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Introduction 
En Resources from the wired network side are exposed to 
unknown users if no action is taken to protect wireless local 
area network (WLAN) security; the Internet connection can 
be used by third parties for illegal activities and wired net-
work traffic can be captured, leaving legitimate users at po-
tential risk of identity theft. Some basic measures securing the 
network against casual access by inexperienced intruders but 
offering no real protection against expert intruder attacks are: 
changing both the access points (AP), factory default adminis-
tration key and service set identifier (SSID), updating the APs 
to support Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) or Wi-Fi protected 
access 2 (WPA2) security, disabling the SSID broadcast to 
prevent connecting non-authorised users, filtering the media 
access control (MAC) address to allow known station only 
connection and adjusting transmitting power to restrict cove-
rage to that which is strictly required. Truly effective meas-
ures for protecting a wireless network must include encrypt-
tion and authentication. 
Regarding encryption, WLAN hardware options are (in order 
of security encryption strength) wired equivalent privacy 
(WEP), WPA and WPA2. WEP is considered unsafe whilst 
WPA and WPA2 provide suitable security levels. The main 
difference between WPA and WPA2 is that the former su-
pports encryption using temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) 
whilst the latter supports encryption using advanced encrypt-
tion standard (AES). Both WPA and WEP use the Rivest Ci-
pher 4 or Ron’s Code 4 (RC4) algorithm but WPA outper-
forms WEP because the encryption key changes dynamically 
for WPA. 
The “Personal” version of WPA and WPA2 is known as a 
pre-shared key (WPA-PSK). The “Enterprise” version of WPA 
or WPA (known as WPA RADIUS) requires a RADIUS server 
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to work in coordination with it. 
WPA-PSK can provide adequate protection for a simple per-
sonal WLAN or a small office WLAN, provided the key (PSK) 
has been randomly chosen and its length is at least 20 cha-
racters (Mokowitz, 2003). 
Both WPA and WP2 have eliminated many WEP weaknesses 
but it is still vulnerable to attacks, particularly in the PSK ver-
sion. 
Authentication should be used to avoid more serious attacks; 
it adds another level of security because the client station is 
required to authenticate on the network. IEEE 802.1x is the 
access control framework for both WPA and WPA2. IEEE 
802.1x supports different types of extensible authentication 
protocol (EAP), in turn being responsible for carrying out the 
actual authentication. The network manager can decide 
whether the RADIUS server will be installed on a computer 
from the internal wired network or within the access point to 
provide authentication (if the AP allows such option). 
Despite WEP’s weakness, RC4 operation and characteristics 
must still be understand because WPA (reasonably safe and 
still frequently used) is based on the RC4 encryption algo-
rithm, using regularly changing keys. WPA and WPA2 opera-
tion must also be considered. 
It should be noted that WPA2 should be used with AES en-
cryption for corporate WLAN and any of the authentication 
options supported by the 802.1X standard enabled. Further-
more, when some access restrictions must be applied to 
computers which are going to access a WLAN system, then 
these computers can be registered into any virtual local area 
network (VLAN) in the wired network and such VLAN be 
treated as an insecure network through a firewall. 
Wired equivalent privacy (WEP) 
WEP is an optional security mechanism for protecting wire-
less networks (IEEE Computer Society LAN MAN Standards 
Committee, 1999). WEP was included in clause 8.2 of the 
first version of 802.11 IEEE and has remained unchanged in 
newer versions of IEEE 802.11 b, 802.11g, 802.11a for en-
suring compatibility amongst different versions. WEP is a 
standard encryption system implemented at the MAC level 
and is supported by most wireless solutions. 
IEEE 802.11 standard security aspects  
IEEE 802.11 provides security through encryption and au-
thentication. Authentication can be done through an “open 
system” or “shared key” in either ad hoc mode or infras-
tructure mode. 
A network station or an access point (AP) can grant per-
mission to any station requesting connection in the open au-
thentication system, or only those included in a predefined 
list. Only those stations having an appropriate encryption key 
will be authenticated in a shared-key system. 
Encryption represents an effective means of preventing jeo-
pardising transmitted data in wireless transmissions. 802.11 
specifies an optional encryption capability called WEP; this 
establishes a similar level of security to that of wired networks 
using encryption of the data being transported by the radio 
signals. WEP uses the RC4 algorithm developed by RSA Data 
Security. WEP is also used for preventing unauthorised users 
from gaining access to WLANs (i.e., provides authentication); 
such purpose is not explicitly set out in 802.11 but is consi-
dered an important feature of WEP. 
WEP is a critical element in obtaining minimum confidential-
lity and data integrity in WLAN systems based on 802.11 as 
well as providing access control through authentication. Con-
sequently, most 802.11-compatible WLAN products support 
WEP as an optional feature. 
Encryption 
WEP uses a secret key shared between a wireless station and 
an access point. All data sent and received between station 
and access point can be encrypted by using the “shared key.” 
802.11 does not specify how the shared key should be es-
tablished but allows for a table associating a unique key with 
each station. However, the same key is usually shared in 
practice amongst all stations and access points within a given 
WLAN system. 
WEP applies a cyclic redundancy check (CRC-32) to plain 
text to protect cipher-text against unauthorised modifications 
while it is in transit, producing an integrity check value (ICV). 
ICV is a type of fingerprint for plain text; it is added to plain 
text and the result is encrypted with a “key stream” and sent 
to the recipient along with the initialisation vector in plain 
text (Figure 1). 
The receiver combines the cipher-text with the key stream to 
retrieve both the plain text and the ICV. It is possible to verify 
that the decryption process has been correct and that the da-
ta has not been altered by applying the integrity check to the 
plain text and comparing the output with the ICV value re-
ceived; if the two ICV values are identical (i.e. matching fin-
gerprints) the message is authenticated. 
 
Figure 1. WEP encryption 
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Authentication 
WEP provides two types of authentication: open system au-
thentication (in which all users are allowed to access the 
WLAN) and shared key authentication controlling access to 
the WLAN and preventing unauthorised access to the net-
work. Authentication through shared key is the safer of the 
two. The latter uses a secret shared key between all stations 
and access points in the WLAN system. When a station tries 
to connect to an access point this replies with a challenge 
random text. The station must use the copy of the shared se-
cret key to encrypt the challenge text and return it to the a-
ccess point for authentication. The access point decodes the 
response by using the same shared key and compares it to 
the challenge text sent earlier. If the two are identical texts, 
the access point sends a confirmation message to the station 
permitting access to the network; if the station does not have 
a key or it sends an incorrect answer, the access point pre-
vents the station from accessing the network. 
Shared key authentication only works if WEP encryption is e-
nabled. If it is not enabled, the system reverts to open system 
default mode (unsafe), allowing (in practice) any station wi-
thin the range of AP coverage to gain access to the network. 
This opens a window for an intruder entering the system and, 
therefore, permits sending, receiving, altering or falsifying 
messages; a minimum security measure when a secure au-
thentication mechanism is required is thus to have WEP ena-
bled.  
Even though shared key authentication is enabled, all wire-
less stations on a WLAN system could have the same shared 
key, depending on how the system was installed. In such net-
works, it is not possible to make an individualised authentic-
cation; all users, including unauthorised ones, possesing the 
shared key will be able to access the network.  
This weakness may result in unauthorised access, especially if 
the system includes a large number of users. The more users 
there are, the greater the likelihood that the key could fall in-
to the wrong hands. 
WEP features 
According to the standard, WEP must provide WLAN confi-
dentiality, authentication and access control. WEP uses the 
same symmetric and static key at the stations as in the access 
point. The standard does not provide any mechanism for au-
tomatic distribution of keys, forcing manual key writing on e-
very network element. This creates several problems; if the 
key is stored in all stations this increases the chances that it 
could be compromised and manual key distribution leads to 
increased maintenance by the network administrator, usually 
meaning that the key is infrequently or never changed. 
WEP encryption algorithm 
The cryptographic algorithm used by the WEP encryption 
method (and the TKIP encryption method used by WPA) is 
RC4, according to the standard, with 64-bit keys (the seed). 
These 64 bits consist of 24 bits for the initialisation vector (IV) 
plus 40-bit shared key (secret). The 40-bit shared key has to 
be distributed manually. Instead, the initialisation vector is 
dynamically produced and should be different for every data 
frame. The initial IV goal was to encrypt 802.11 frames with 
different keys to prevent a potential attacker from capturing 
enough encrypted traffic with the same key and finally dedu-
cing the key. Unfortunately, new tools have been developed, 
such as BackTrack 2 (Aharoni et al., 2007) and “Klein’s attack 
on RC4” have been expanded allowing an attacker to easily 
obtain the shared key in a few minutes, for example, as a-
ccomplished by the PTW attack (Pyshkin et al., 2007).  
Both sides must know the secret key and the IV. The key is 
known by both sides since it is stored in the configuration of 
each network device; however, the IV is produced at one 
end and is sent in a frame to the other end.  
WEP is encrypted via the following steps: 
1. Calculate CRC-32 for 802.11 frame payload and concate-
nate the result (ICV); 
 2. Concatenate the 40-bit shared secret key to the 24-bit IV 
to form a 64-bit seed; 
3. Input the seed obtained in step 2 into the RC4 pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG) to generate a sequence of 
pseudo-random characters (called key stream) with a number 
of octets equal to the number of octets in step 1; 
4. XOR the resulting characters from steps 1 and 3 to obtain 
the cipher-text; and 
5. Send the IV (unencrypted) and the encrypted message wi-
thin the IEEE 802.11 frame “frame body” field. 
The decoding algorithm is similar to the previous one. As the 
other end will know the IV and the secret key then it will 
have the seed and can thus generate the key stream. XOR o-
peration of encrypted received data with the key stream will 
unencrypt the message (payload and ICV). CRC is done. It 
should be noted that WEP has come to be considered unsafe 
(Ioannidis et al., 2001). 
RC4 cryptographic algorithm 
RC4 (or ARC4) is the most frequently used stream cipher in 
cryptography; it is used in some of the most popular proto-
cols such as transport layer security (TLS) or secure socket la-
yer (SSL) to protect Internet traffic and wired equivalent pri-
vacy (WEP) to add wireless network security. Using WEP is 
not recommended in modern systems; however, some RC4-
based systems are safe enough for common use. 
The RC4 cryptography algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest 
of RSA Security in 1987; its full name is Rivest Cipher 4, ta-
king the alternative acronym RC for “Ron’s Code” which is u-
sed by RC2, RC5 and RC 6 encryption algorithms. 
RC4 is part of the most commonly used encryption methods 
such as WEP, TKIP (WPA) for wireless cards and TLS. RC4’s 
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substantial speed and simplicity are among the main factors 
that have helped it to be used in such a wide range of appli-
cations. Implementing RC4 both in hardware and software is 
quite easy, requiring few resources to deliver high throughput 
(Baghaei and Hunt 2004). 
RC4 (Schneier, 1996) generates a pseudorandom stream of 
bytes (key stream) which is XOR added to the plain text for 
encryption. Deciphering the message is done in the same 
way. 
To generate the key stream, the encryption algorithm has an 
internal secret state consisting of the following: 
-A permutation of 256 bytes called S vector or simply "S"; 
-Two 8-bit index pointers: i and j; and 
-The permutation is initialised with a variable-length key, 
usually 40-256 bits, using a key scheduling algorithm (KSA). 
Once key scheduling is done, the ciphering “key stream” is 
produced by means of a pseudo-random generation algo-
rithm (PRGA). 
RC4 uses two blocks for encryption: KSA and PRGA. The 
following is RC4’s pseudo-code: 
/ * S = S VECTOR with fixed 256 bytes * /size  
/ * K = VECTOR which contains the seed * / 
/ * L = length of seed (IV length plus SK length) * / 
/ * N = 256, S vector size * / 
KSA (K, S)  
FOR (i = 0 to N - 1)    
  S[i]= i   (1) 
j = 0 
FOR (i = 0 to N - 1)  (2) 
j = (j + S[i] + K[i mod L]) mod N  
  SWAP(S[i], S[j]) 
PRGA(S) 
i = 0   (3) 
j = 0 
Frame production loop  
i = (i + 1) mod N  (4) 
j = (j + S[i]) mod N 
SWAP(S[i], S[j])  
OUTPUT = S [(S[i] + S[j]) mod N] 
The previous pseudo-code assumed that the seed vector K [i] 
contained values [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, C, Z] at the respective 
positions for i from zero to seven. 
A 256 position memory block is allocated for the S vector for 
KSA. Part (1) of the pseudo-code initialises the array with va-
lues from 0 to 255. 
In part (2), the two pointers to the S vector, i and j are initia-
lised to zero. Then j is relocated into a pseudo-random po-
sition depending on seed vector K content.  
j = j + S[0] + K[0] = 0 + 0 + 4 = 4  
Then there is a swapping of the values in the S pointed by i 
and j. This is done 256 times for each frame which must be 
encrypted. 
As a result, if the value of the seed vector K is not known, it is 
not possible to know the final contents of the S vector in ad-
vance. 
Part (3) corresponds to the initialisation of pointers i and j. 
A reordering or scrambling is done in Part (4) producing an 
output value (octet) which depends on the S vector obtained 
in part (2); this cycle is performed as many times as the frame 
to be encrypted has bytes. 
For example, assuming that after the 256 iterations of part (2) 
completed S = [4, 3, 5, 1, 8, 0, 6 ,....., 255] then in part (4), i 
= i + 1 = 0 + 1 = 1 and j = 0 + S [1] = 0 + 3 = 3, after 
swapping the two positions S [i] and S [j], the contents of the 
S vector will be [4, 1, 5, 3, 8, 0, 6 ,....., 255]. 
Finally, the output value will be the position of S given by S [i] 
+ S [j] = S [1] + S [3] = 1 + 3 = 4; then the output value 
will be S [4] = 8. The first octet of the message is then added 
using XOR to 8 and leading the first octet encrypted. 
WEP simulation tool 
The WEP encryption method’s nine blocks (Figure 1) were 
developed in C++ Builder to practice and experiment 
through simulation with an educational goal. Figure 2 shows 
the application interface which allows entering and calcula-
ting values for WEP message encryption.  
For example, when entering the following input values: 
1: Vector initialisation (3 bytes in decimal) = 922 
2: Shared key (5 bytes in ASCII): 2e3f4 
3: Message (up to 250 bytes in ASCII): hello 
The following output results are obtained: 
4: Key stream (hex): 65E27CDCEF7FF5C7 
5: CRC32 (hex): 6FA0F988 
6: Encrypted text (hex): 0D8D10BD80DF0C4F 
These results can be verified by clicking button 12, “RC4 Va-
lidation” of the window. 
Temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) 
WPA encryption and integrity verification (Wi-Fi protected 
access) is based on the temporary key integrity protocol 
(TKIP) defined in clause 8.3.2 of the original IEEE 802.11i 
(IEEE Computer Society LAN MAN Standards Committee, 
2004) and added later to current IEEE 802.11-2007 standard. 
TKIP creates a frame key for each frame before being cipher-
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red using WEP. The frame key is based on a temporal key 
(data encryption key) and the value of the TSC (TKIP sequen-
ce, also called IV). TKIP also uses the Michael integrity check 
(MIC) algorithm with the message integrity check key (MK) to 
generate a frame integrity value or MIC. TKIP requires the fo-
llowing elements to perform encryption and data integrity 
verification: 
-A temporal key (TK), being a previously-agreed data encryp-
tion key; 
-The TSC (TKIP Sequence) or initialisation vector (IV) which 
starts at 0 and increases for each frame sent; this IV allows 
the use of the same TK for several frames; 
-The IEEE 802.11 frame MAC destination address (DA) and 
MAC source address (SA); 
The value of the priority field which has been reserved for fu-
ture use and defaults to 0; 
-Message integrity check key; and 
-The payload. 
 
Figure 2. WEP simulation tool GUI 
Figure 3 shows TKIP encryption and integrity carried out on a 
frame, summarised as follows: 
1. The IV (TSC), MAC destination address (DA) and TKK are 
introduced into a key mixing function which is a hash 
function, exchanging certain blocks of bytes several times, 
depending on IV value. This step produces a 128-bit 
block, equivalent to having a new 24-bit IV and a 104-bit 
key per frame as input to the RC4 algorithm.  
2. The DA, SA, priority, data (802.11 unencrypted payload) 
and MIC keys are introduced into the Michael function 
which performs a one-way hash calculation as specified in 
RFC 1423 (Balenson, 1999), producing the MIC value. 
3. The ICV is calculated with the CRC-32. 
4. The new IV and the key obtained at step 1 are introduced 
into the RC4 generator (PNRG) to produce a key stream 
which is the same size (in bytes) as the data, MIC and ICV. 
5. An XOR function is applied to the combination of data, 
MIC, and ICV with the key stream to produce the encryp-
ted part of the 802.11 payload. 
6. The encrypted part obtained in step 5 is encapsulated a-
long with the IV and IEEE 802.11 frame headers.  
 
Figure 3. WPA encryption and integrity check  
WI-FI protected access 2 (WPA-2) 
WPA-2 introduced by the Wi-Fi Alliance was ratified in IEEE 
802.11i clause 9.3.3 in June 2004. The WPA2 protocol in-
cludes the following features [8]:  
-IEEE 802.1X authentication; 
-Extensible authentication protocol (EAP); and 
-Encryption using advanced encryption standard (AES) (NIST, 
2001). 
WPA2 is used in CCMP (counter with CBC MAC protocol) 
mode for implementing AES in 802.11i, including: 
-128-bit keys; 
-Using AES in CBC-MAC mode for calculating MIC and AES 
in counter mode for data encryption; and 
-Guaranteeing 48 bit initialisation vector. 
WPA-2 improves WEP shortcomings but, unlike WPA, incur-
porates AES encryption mechanisms to reduce vulnerabilities 
which could introduce hash functions with WPA TKIP. WPA-
2 uses a TK and a packet number (PN) field to prevent a-
ttacks by repeating frames. The authentication phase and pair 
master key (PMK) derivation are performed according to IEEE 
802.1X. 
WPA-2 uses AES in CBC-MAC mode to calculate MIC and 
AES in counter mode to encrypt the payload. Figure 4 shows 
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these two processes performed in parallel. 
Figure 4. WPA-2 encryption and integrity check  
Message integrity check (MIC): AES uses the data integrity 
key at this stage: 
1. A 128 bit Init Block (starting block), as explained below, 
and the data integrity key are introduced into AES in CCMP 
mode producing a 128-bit block. 
2. An XOR is applied to the result of the previous step with 
the first 128 bits of the IEEE 802.11 payload block, producing 
a 128-bit block. 
3. The result from step 2 is introduced into AES in CCMP 
mode producing a 128-bit block. 
4. Steps 2 and 3 are carried out with the remaining 128-bit 
payload blocks, except for the PN field, used for numbering 
the frame and already included on the starting block. 
This is done until the last 128-bit block of the payload field. 
From the last 128 bits resulting from the AES-CCMP function, 
the 64 most significant bits are taken and named “R1.” R1 
corresponds to unencrypted MIC. 
WPA-2 builds the starting block (used for calculating MIC) 
using the following information: 
-The flag field (8 bits) is set at 01011001. This field contains 
several flags, including the one that specifies that a 64-bit 
MIC length is in use; 
-The priority field (8 bits) which is fixed at 0 and is reserved 
for future use; 
-The source address field (48 bits) from the IEEE 802.11 fra-
me MAC header; 
-The PN field (48 bit); and 
-Data length field (16 bits). 
There are two padding fields at the beginning and end of the 
payload frame used to complete the payload or the header 
to match 128-bit blocks. 
Data encryption: AES uses the DEK obtained during the 
802.1X authentication process. 
AES is used in counter mode for payload encryp-
tion. An initial 128-bit counter is used with the fo-
llowing fields to start the process: 
-Flag field (8 bits) set at 01011001 containing 
several flags, including the one which specifies 
that a 64-bit MIC length is in use; 
-The priority field (8 bits) which is fixed at 0 and is 
reserved for future use; 
-Source address field (48 bits) from the IEEE 
802.11 MAC frame header; 
-PN field (48 bits); and 
-Counter field (16 bits) which is fixed at 1 and is 
only increased if the 802.11 frame payload is frag-
mented. It should be noted that this counter is 
only part of the counter that inputs to the AES 
function in counter mode, which is actually modi-
fied by the package number (field PN) if the pay-
load is not fragmented. 
The payload is encrypted as follows after this 128-bit initial 
counter has been built: 
1. The initial counter is input into an AES function in counter 
mode along with the data encryption key producing a 128-
bit block; 
2. With this result, an XOR is applied to the first 128 payload 
bits (clear text payload) producing the first 802.11 frame pay-
load 128 ciphered bits; and 
3. The initial counter is increased in step 1 and step 2 is re-
peated with the following 128 bits of clear text payload. This 
is done until finishing the encryption of the entire frame’s 
payload.  
The counter is increased and its value is sent to the AES func-
tion. The result is XORed with the MIC (and of course with 
R1) and the most significant 64 ciphered bits are taken and 
encapsulated along with the frame check sequence (FCS) 
and IEEE 802.11 header. 
Table 1. Main features of WEP, WPA, and WPA-2 
 
 WEP WPA WPA-2 




Cryptographic algorithm RC4 RC4 AES 
Key size 40 O 104 bits 128 bits 128 bits 
Encryption method WEP TKIP CCMP 
Data integrity CRC32 MIC CCM 
Keys for packets No Yes Yes 
IV length 24 bits 48 bits 48 bits 
 
Practical examples of wireless network 
security in IEEE 802.11 
The following didactic examples show the steps carried out 
for configuring a Cisco AP model AIR-AP1242AG-AK9 and a 
Linksys WUSB54GC wireless card (installed in a PC) to create 
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a WLAN working both in personal WPA (TKIP) mode and 
personal WPA-2 (AES) mode.  
 
Figure 5. Network diagram to setup the access point in personal mode 
(WPA or WPA-2) 
Setting the AP to operate in personal WPA (TKIP) 
mode with shared password 
After basic setup of the access point, launch a browser from a 
wired station and log in to it. Once within the AP, select the 
Security option and in the Encryption Manager option con-
duct the following steps: 
a. Choose Enable cipher for TKIP; 
b. Delete the value of the encryption key 1; 
c. Set the encryption key 2 as the key for transmission; and 
d. Apply this setup to the Dot11Radio0 radio interface. 
At the SSID Manager perform the following steps: 
e. ssid = ap-with-psk-tkip (name assigned to the SSID); 
f. Apply the configured ssid to the 802.11G radio; 
g. Activate “Open authentication” and select <No additi-
on>; 
h. Choose “Key Management = Mandatory”, select the box 
“Enable WPA” and select “WPA” at the immediate option; 
i. Fill “WPA pre-shared Key = 0123456789” and flag the 
circular button “ASCII”; and 
j. Apply the settings. 
This generates the following lines on the AP’s Dot11Radio0 
radio interface configuration file: 
 ! 
dot11 ssid ap-with-psk-tkip 
 authentication open  
 authentication key-management wpa 
 wpa-psk ascii 7 055B575D72181B5F4E5D4E 
! 
interface Dot11Radio0 
 encryption mode ciphers tkip  
 ! 
 ssid ap-with-psk-tkip 
Create a profile with ssid name matching the AP’s ssid (ap-
with-psk-tkip) to which you wish to connect in personal com-
puters equipped with WUSB54GC cards; set the option “se-
curity = WPA-Personal” and fill in the shared key with the 
value “0123456789”. Save the configuration and connect to 
the AP. Check that the WUSB54GC card associates with the 
AP, receives an IP address from the DHCP server and can 
communicate with other computers which are connected to 
the wired network. 
Setting the AP to operate in Personal WPA-2 (AES) 
mode with shared password 
Select the Security option and at the Encryption Manager 
option conduct the following steps: 
a. Choose cipher for AES-CCMP; 
b. Delete the value of encryption key 1; 
c. Set the encryption key 2 as the key for transmission; and 
d. Apply this setup to the Dot11Radio0 radio interface. 
At SSID Manager perform the following: 
e. ssid = ap-with-psk-aes; 
f. Apply the configured ssid to the 802.11G radio; 
g. Activate “Open authentication” and select <No 
addition>; 
h. Choose “Key Management = Mandatory”, select the box 
“Enable WPA” and select “WPA” at the immediate option; 
i. Fill “WPA Preshared Key = 0123456789” and flag the 
circular button “ASCII”; and 
j. Apply the settings. 
This generates the following lines at the configuration file of 
the AP’s Dot11Radio0 radio interface: 
 ! 
dot11 ap-with-psk-aes 
 authentication open  
 authentication key-management wpa 




encryption mode ciphers aes-ccm  
 ssid ap-with-psk-aes 
Create a profile with an ssid name, which must match the 
AP’s ssid (ap-with-psk-aes) to which you wish to connect in 
the personal computers equipped with WUSB54GC cards; 
set the option “security = PSK2” and fill in the shared key 
with the value “0123456789”. Save the configuration and 
connect to the AP. Check that the PC’s WUSB54GC card a-
ssociates with the AP, receives an IP address from the DHCP 
server and can communicate with other computers connec-
ted to the wired network. 
Conclusions 
The WEP protocol is vulnerable to attacks; the problem does 
not lie with the RC4 algorithm used by WEP but the way in 
which the encryption keys are managed and generated to be 
used as RC4 algorithm input. Other RC4 algorithm-based se-
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curity protocols such as transport layer security, secure socket 
layer and WPA are more secure for practical uses. 
Due to the weaknesses found in WEP, new alternatives such 
as WPA (based on RC4 and TKIP) and WPA-2 (based on 
AES/CCMP) have emerged to reduce the lack-of security stig-
ma of wireless networks, ensuring confidence in their use in 
homes, businesses, schools, universities, etc. These new le-
vels of security are achieved through greater security imple-
mentation providing strong encryption and incorporating au-
thentication such as RADIUS or DIAMETER. 
WPA and WPA-2 have two modes of operation in terms of 
authentication: pre-shared key (PSK) and IEEE 802.1x. The 
PSK operation mode (also known as WPA Personal mode) is 
aimed for small office/home office (SOHO) wireless networks 
which do not have authentication servers, this mode being 
quite easy to configure as shown in the two practical exam-
ples presented here. The IEEE 802.1x operation mode (also 
known as WPA Enterprise mode) is aimed at Corporations 
having existing authentication server infrastructure, such a 
RADIUS servers; as could be expected, this mode of opera-
tion is harder to configure. 
Some wireless networks with old or legacy hardware are still 
using WEP; however, there are no reasons in terms of both 
security and performance to use anything less than WPA-2 or 
at least WPA in modern wireless networks. 
It is expected that the basis for understanding the operation, 
main features, usage, advantages and disadvantages of the 
different security options available for IEEE 802.11 wireless 
networks discussed in this paper could contribute to enri-
ching discussion on these matters. 
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